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 Mapping (Utmost) Good Faith in Insurance Law – Future 
Conditional? 
 
Professors B. Soyer* and A.M. Tettenborn** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
 
Any homeowner who has had alterations done will confirm that an architect's plans, 
however meticulously prepared, never seem quite to match real life. There is always 
something awkward and unexpected that appears when it is too late to do anything 
about it. Law reform projects are much the same: however suited to solving the 
problem at hand, some difficulty can be trusted to appear. This article concerns one 
part of one such project. The project is the reform of insurance law under the 
Insurance Act 2015, which greatly limits the application of traditional common law 
principles developed by Lord Mansfield in the late eighteenth century. The part we 
are concerned with is the traditional classification of an insurance contract as a 
contract requiring a showing of utmost good faith, and how far this continues to apply 
today. 
 
The background to this article, the Insurance Act 2015, can be fairly quickly 
summarised. It is a short piece of legislation aimed at the partial reform of English 
commercial insurance law. Backed by the insurance industry in the shape of the 
Association of British Insurers and drafted by the Law Commissions,1 its effect is to 
remove a number of oddities, anomalies and uncertainties that have bedevilled 
English commercial insurance law for some two hundred years.2 Two issues do not 
concern this article: namely, the re-writing of the common law rules on the effect of 
insurance warranties, widely accepted to be anomalous and far too favourable to the 
insurer; and certain highly technical changes to the Third Parties (Rights against 
Insurers) Act 2010 aimed at removing drafting errors that had so far prevented that 
Act being brought into force. Two others, however, are highly relevant. First, the 
2015 Act introduces a new regime to deal with the effect of misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure by the assured. The traditional but draconian remedy of allowing the 
insurer to avoid the contract on the basis that misstatement or non-disclosure is a 
breach of a duty of utmost good faith is removed. Instead, a modernised duty of “fair 
presentation” is placed on the assured, with a more modulated set of remedies 
available to the insurer where this duty is broken. Secondly, the Act provides new 
rules replacing those available at common law in respect of another matter 
sometimes regarded as an aspect of the duty of utmost good faith, namely, the effect 
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1 In the plural: this was a joint exercise undertaken by the English and Scottish Law Commissions. 
2 The process started with a scoping paper in 2006. For progress reports see B. Soyer (ed.), 
Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance Law (London: Informa, 2008); R. Merkin and J. 
Lowry, “Reconstructing Insurance Law: The Law Commissions’ Consultation Paper” (2008) 71 
M.L.R. 95; G. Blackwood, “The Pre-contractual Duty of (Utmost) Good Faith: The Past and the 
Future” [2013] L.M.C.L.Q. 311; S. Rainey, “The Law Commission’s Proposals for the Reform of An 
Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims Made under Business Insurance Contracts” [2013] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 357 and B. Soyer, “Beginning of A New Era for Insurance Warranties” [2013] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 384.            
on the insurer's liability of an assured making a fraudulent claim under a policy – 
another matter previously both anomalous and uncertain.  
 
Unfortunately all this leaves one important question hanging: after the 2015 reforms, 
what is the status today of the rule that an insurance contract is classified as a 
contract requiring the utmost good faith? The difficulty is that the traditional instances 
of utmost good faith that are said to mark out insurance contracts as a race apart are 
precisely the areas taken over in the two provisions referred to above. In any book 
on the law of contract, the characterisation of insurance contracts as contracts 
requiring utmost good faith is supported by the example of the extended role of 
avoidance for misrepresentation, covering not only positive statements but also (in 
contrast to the general rule in English law) material non-disclosure. Some also give 
as a further instance the right to avoid for later fraud, notably making a fraudulent 
claim, something which (it is highly arguable) follows a fortiori from any general 
obligation of good faith.3 But both of these areas are now covered by Parts 2 and 4 
of the 2015 Act. Furthermore, this coverage is explicitly made exhaustive: under s. 
14 of the 2015 Act, “any rule of law permitting a party to a contract of insurance to 
avoid the contract on the ground that the utmost good faith has not been observed 
by the other party is abolished.”4  
 
One might be forgiven for thinking that the result of all this was to render effectively 
redundant the traditional classification of insurance contracts as requiring utmost 
good faith. If its two characteristic functions have been supplanted by bespoke 
statutory remedies, and, for good measure, any other right to avoid the contract for 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith has gone, can it not now be quietly forgotten? 
Unfortunately, life is not as simple as this. First, there are some dicta that the 
obligation of utmost good faith extends beyond rights to avoid for fraud, 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure.5 And secondly, this was not the intention of 
the Act. The Law Commissions explicitly recommended preserving the role of utmost 
good faith, ostensibly as an “interpretative principle” but apparently with one eye on 
allowing future developments on the basis of it.6 And, as if this was not clear enough, 
the treatment in the 2015 Act of s. 17 of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906 
confirms the point. This provision, long accepted as reproducing the common law 
and hence applying de facto to all insurance,7 used to state: “A contract of marine 
insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if the utmost good 
faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party.” 
                                            
3 In Black King Shipping Corp v. Massie (The Litson Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437, for example, 
Hirst J, seems to proceed on the premise that advancing a fraudulent claim is a breach of the duty 
of utmost good faith on the part of the assured.  See also the judgment of Evans J, in Continental 
Illinois National Bank & Trust Co of Chicago v. Alliance Assurance Co Ltd (The Captain Panagos 
DP) [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 470.       
4 Continued existence of the remedy of “avoidance” would have undermined the reforms introduced 
by the Insurance Act 2015, especially introduction of proportional remedies in case of pre-
contractual non-disclosure or misrepresentation.     
5 See in particular the dissenting judgment of Pill LJ, in Drake Insurance plc v. Provident Insurance 
plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834; [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 268 at [177]. 
6 Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer ’s Remedies for Fraudulent 
Claims; and Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/13, Chap. 30. 
7 See, e.g., Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501 at 518 
(Lord Mustill). 
The latter words understandably had to be suppressed to accommodate s. 14 of the 
2015 Act; but the former ones remain. 
 
In the light of the above, we can now turn to the main subject of this article: what is 
the present effect of the statement in s. 17 of the MIA 1906 that “a contract of marine 
insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith” and the common law rule 
which that provision reproduces? The Law Commissions' view on the proposals 
which became the Insurance Act 2015 is that, in essence, the requirement of utmost 
good faith ceases to be significant as a matter of substantive law. However, together 
with a large number of consultees they see a large role for it as an interpretative 
principle running through commercial insurance law, and they emphasize that 
insurance contracts continue to be a special type of agreement marked off from 
contracts as a whole.8 Both these issues need looking at closely, and they will be 
treated separately. 
 
 
 
II. AN “INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLE” 
 
One of the Law Commissions' suggestions is that, even if the traditional effects of a 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith have been taken away, it may continue to act 
as a special feature of insurance contracts by acting as a powerful “interpretative 
principle”. The meaning of this suggestion, which is not carried over into the 2015 
Act, is not entirely clear; and indeed there must be room for some doubt whether 
very much at all lies behind it other than a desire not to cause possible uncertainty, in 
a market which has happily lived with the idea of utmost good faith for a number of 
years, by getting rid of the requirement.  
 
One possibility is that utmost good faith should, as an implied term, supplement 
insurance contracts by adding to them, as default rules,9 implied contractual 
obligations which would not otherwise obtain at all.10 There is something to support 
this view. Some obligations applying to the insurance relationship, such as the 
insured's obligation not to prejudice the insurer's rights of subrogation, are already 
referred to almost interchangeably as implied terms and obligations of good faith.11 
Express obligations to show utmost good faith are, moreover, fairly common, not 
                                            
8 Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent 
Claims; and Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/13, para. 30.22. 
9 Default because there is no restriction, either at common law or under the Act, on exclusion of 
utmost good faith duties. However, public policy would possibly not permit an assured to rely on 
an exclusion clause of that nature to exonerate himself in the event of fraud on his part in the 
presentation of the risk: S Pearson & Son Ltd v Dublin Corporation [1907] A.C. 351. See also Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 at 502 (Steyn LJ) 
and HIH Casualty & General Insurance  Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001] EWCA Civ 
735; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 161 at [128].       
10 As happens in Australia by statute: see s. 13(1) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) and 
e.g., CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2006) 235 C.L.R. 1. Also see UEB 
Packaging Ltd v QBE Insurance (International) Ltd [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 64, at 69 (Tipping J). 
11 In Boag v Standard Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1937] 2 K.B. 113 the Court of Appeal regarded it as 
purely an implied term: in Horwood v Land of Leather Ltd [2010] EWHC 546 (Comm); [2010] 1 
C.L.C. 423 at [67] Teare J combined both analyses by regarding it as an implied term “which 
obliges the insured to act in good faith and reasonably with regard to the interests of the insurer.” 
See too Willumsen v Royal Insurance Co Ltd (1975) 63 D.L.R. (3d) 112 at [22]. 
only in joint venture and similar contracts,12 but also in insurance policies,13 and 
these do indeed create added obligations on the authorities, such as duties to take 
positive steps to adhere to the spirit of the contract, to forward the agreed common 
purpose, and to act consistently with the justified expectations of the parties.14 
Furthermore, it could be argued that such a starting-point would fit in fairly neatly 
with the accepted view that duties to observe good faith, let alone utmost good faith, 
do not form a general part of the English law of contract, applying only in particular 
types of contract.15 But this does not seem to be the approach of insurance law. 
There is clear authority at common law that the duty of good faith is not an implied 
term in the contract.16 Furthermore, in the insurance context the tendency has been 
to limit, rather than extend, possible further contractual duties owed by either party.17 
The Law Commissions too are sceptical about the possible substantive effects of the 
recast duty, save perhaps in “extremely rare” instances of an “especially hard case or 
emergent difficulty”.18 What is more likely is that what they envisage is simply the use 
of the idea of “utmost good faith” as a matter of construction or interpretation of the 
wording of existing insurance contracts.19 Certainly this accords with the examples 
they give: apart from an enigmatic reference to its very occasional use to plug 
unforeseen holes in insurance contract law, they provide as instances20 the use of 
utmost good faith to supplement the description of “fair presentation” (by penalising 
insureds who reveal the “bare minimum” of information, hoping no awkward 
                                            
12 For recent examples, see CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] EWHC 
1535 (Ch); [2010] C.I.L.L. 2908; Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK 
Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ. 200; [2013] B.L.R. 265; Archer v Nubuke Investments LLP [2014] EWHC 
3425 (Ch). 
13 An example being a claims handling clause in issue in Federal Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury 
Trust v Federal-Mogul Ltd (formerly T&N plc) [2014] EWHC 2002 (Comm); [2014] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 
671, requiring the defence to be conducted by the insurers “in a businesslike manner in the spirit 
of good faith and fair dealing, having regard to the legitimate interests of the parties to this Policy 
and of the reinsurers thereof.” 
14 Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200 at [111] 
(Jackson LJ), quoting Vos J in CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] 
EWHC 1535 (Ch); [2010] C.I.L.L. 2908 at [246]. See too Eder J in the insurance case of Federal-
Mogul Ltd (formerly T&N plc) [2014] EWHC 2002 (Comm); [2014] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 671 at [119]–
[120]. 
15 See the useful summary by Leggatt J in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] 
EWHC 111; [2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 526 at [132].   
16 See, e.g., Joel v. Law Union Insurance Co [1908] 2 K.B. 863 at 886; March Cabaret Club Ltd v 
London Insurance [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 169 at 175 (May J); Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v 
Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 Q.B. 665 at 701–702 (Steyn J). A neat example where 
the point was crucial is the Australian decision in Khoury v Government Insurance Office (NSW) 
(1984) 165 C.L.R. 622 (non-disclosure by insured a matter of general law, and thus not within a 
New South Wales statute giving court power to grant relief to insured in breach of a “term or 
condition” of the contract). To be fair, however, there are also dicta the other way: e.g., William 
Pickersgill & Sons Ltd v London & Provincial Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1912] 3 K.B. 614 at 621, 
and also Manifest Shipping & Co Ltd v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd & Le Réunion Europpéene 
(The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 A.C. 469 at [48] (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough). 
17 For example, the decisions in Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd 
[1990] 1 QB 665 and Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 111. 
18 Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent 
Claims; and Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/13, at para.30.23. 
19 Compare the old case of Re Bradley & Essex Accident Indemnity Soc [1912] 1 K.B. 415, where 
Farwell LJ at 430 thought the construction of insurance contracts contra proferentem was an 
aspect of good faith. This seems unconvincing. 
20 Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent 
Claims; and Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/13, at para.30.23. 
questions will be asked about further facts they know), and the use of good faith 
concepts to inform the question whether to imply contractual terms into a policy 
under the traditional “business efficacy” test.21  
 
But even this causes difficulty. The problem here is how much the Law Commissions' 
view reflects the idea of utmost good faith as traditionally understood in the 
insurance context (and reflected in the first part of s. 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906). To characterise a contract of insurance as a contract based on utmost good 
faith has always been understood as meaning that it is something qualitatively 
different from ordinary contracts:22 there are, in other words, ordinary contracts, and 
then there are contracts requiring utmost good faith, including insurance contracts 
and a number of others (clear instances being partnership contracts and 
arrangements to divide family property), to which special principles apply. In the 
cases cited by the Commissions it is hard to see much sign of this. In the first 
example, presumably the extra undisclosed information is relevant: and if so, then on 
orthodox principles it is disclosable under the duty of “fair presentation” anyway; 
good faith, whether as interpretative tool or otherwise, is beside the point. As for the 
second, the “business efficacy” test applies generally in the law of contract as a 
whole, and it is not entirely clear how the question whether a given term is necessary 
to promote it could be informed or supplemented by the invocation of good faith.  
 
Indeed, it is possible to go further, and to argue that there is no room for any 
separate concept of “utmost good faith” interpretation, since the current rules of 
interpretation of commercial contracts generally, as developed by decisions from 
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society23 to 
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd24 and Attorney-General of Belize v Belize 
Telecom Ltd,25 leave ample scope for it already. As a result of these cases, whose 
principles apply just as much in the context of insurance as in any other kind of 
contract,26 it is difficult to see anything otherwise classifiable under good faith that is 
not already taken account of: obligations under contracts are construed and 
supplemented according to what will best further the apparent commercial purpose 
of the parties, contracts must be read as a whole, literal meanings can be ignored 
where necessary, and so on.27 Furthermore, if the contract is of a kind that in its 
nature requires a degree of long-term commitment and fidelity from the parties, that 
                                            
21 See, in particular, Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (No.2) [2001] EWCA Civ. 
1047; [2001] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 667; Goshawk Dedicated Ltd v Tyser & Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ. 
54; [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 566; and Bonner v. Cox [2005] EWCA Civ. 1512; [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
152. 
22 Unless, of course, one argues that all contracts ought to be subject to good faith, and hence that 
on principle there is no reason to treat insurance as a special class at all. For an example of this 
argument, see R. Ashton, “Keeping the Faith – Good Faith in Insurance and the Emergence of 
General Contractual Good Faith” (2011) 22 Ins. L.J. 81. 
23 [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896. 
24 [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 1101. 
25 [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988. 
26 For a  comprehensive analysis on how new parameters in contractual construction have had an 
influence on insurance case law see B. Soyer, “New Parameters in Construing Insurance 
Contracts” published as Chapter 2 in DR Thomas (ed), Modern Law of Marine Insurance Volume 
4, (London: Informa, 2015) and cases such as BAI (Run Off) Ltd v Durham [2012] UKSC 14; 
[2012] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 371 
27 See, e.g., Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111; [2013] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 526 at [134] (Leggatt J). 
too can be dealt with using the usual rules of interpretation without the need to 
invoke any particular concept of “good faith contracts”.28 
 
 
III. THE CONTINUED SIGNIFICANCE OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH AS A 
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLE 
 
As mentioned above, the Law Commissions in their Report on Insurance Contract 
Law suggested that the concept of utmost good faith as a creator of substantive 
rights and duties, rather than as a subsidiary principle of interpretation, would 
effectively disappear as a result of the legislation that became the Insurance Act 
2015.29 The question is whether this is correct, or whether there remains more scope 
than appears for utmost good faith concepts to affect insurance contracts and their 
performance. 
 
At first sight, it might be thought that a combination of the 2015 Act and established 
case-law provided an open-and-shut case for the Law Commissions' position. It is 
not only that the Act has supplanted the old common law duty in the two most high-
profile aspects of utmost good faith, pre-contract information and fraudulent claims. 
More important is the combination of Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) 
Insurance Co Ltd30 and s. 14 of the 2015 Act. In Banque Keyser Ullmann the Court of 
Appeal rebuffed an attempt to invoke a breach of the duty of utmost good faith (there 
a deliberate failure by underwriters to inform) as a breach of contract sounding in 
damages, implying that the only remedy for infringement was avoidance of the 
contract;31 but since s. 14 now bars avoidance for any breach of that duty, it must 
follow that the duty itself is now devoid of substantive content.  
 
It is submitted, with respect, that this argument will not do, for a number of reasons. 
First, Banque Keyser Ullmann and the following cases following it are authority32 that 
damages are not available for breach of the good faith duty where the breach lies in 
non-disclosure. They do not, it is suggested, rule out damages for breaches of other 
aspects of the good faith duty.33 Secondly, it is always worth remembering that there 
                                            
28 A point admitted by Leggatt J in what can be regarded as the high point of “good faith” thinking, 
Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd  [2013] EWHC 111 (QB);  [2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
526: see [132] and [143]. 
29 As suggested in earlier articles when the Law Commissions were shaping their proposals: e.g., C 
Butcher, “Good Faith in Insurance Law: A Redundant Concept?” [2008] J.B.L. 375. 
30 [1990] 1 Q.B. 665 (CA). 
31 See also, HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2001] EWCA Civ. 1250; 
[2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 483 at [49] (Rix LJ); The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 A.C. 469 at [49] 
(Lord Hobhouse). On appeal in the Banque Keyser Ullmann case ([1991] 2 A.C. 249), it was held 
that there had in fact been no breach of the duty, but this did not affect the decision on the 
damages point (which indeed was expressly endorsed by Lords Templeman (at 280) and Jauncey 
(at 281)). See also, to similar effect, Stansfield Group Pte Ltd v Consumers’ Association of 
Singapore [2011] 4 S.L.R. 130 at [185]-[190]. 
32 Notably, in Slade LJ's argument that the duty to disclose and the correlative right to avoid for non-
disclosure are a matter of equity, despite strong evidence that they have firm foundations in 
common-law cases such as Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr. 1905; 97 E.R. 1162. The point is 
usefully discussed in B. Harris, “Should Insurance Risk Avoidance Be Reformed and Would 
Reform Be of A Right of Equitable Rescission or A Right Sui Generis?” [2013] J.B.L. 23, at pp. 24–
26. 
33 “I cannot for an instant accept [counsel's] suggestion that a breach of this duty [to act with good 
faith in conducting legal proceedings] by an insurer, once a policy is in force, gives the assured no 
are possible remedies other than damages and avoidance.34 These include not only 
other money remedies such as those based on unjust enrichment, but also, more 
importantly, the response of ineffectiveness (in the case where restrictions are put on 
the exercise of rights). And thirdly, there are a number of documented cases where 
the courts have intervened on the basis of a lack of utmost good faith, and which are 
not caught by the 2015 Act. These subdivide into a number of categories. But this is 
a large subject and deserves a section to itself.  
 
First, there are decisions suggesting that considerations of utmost good faith may on 
occasion control (and where necessary invalidate) the exercise of rights arising 
under an insurance contract. One instance is the liability insurer's invariable right to 
take over and control legal proceedings against the insured. In Groom v Crocker35 
the Court of Appeal were in no doubt that, because of the obvious potential conflict of 
interest involved, insurers could only do this “in what they bona fide consider to be 
the common interest of themselves and their assured.”36 Hence there the court took 
the view that an insurer could not legitimately admit fault by the assured for reasons 
not of forensic tactics but to safeguard the insurer's own private knock-for-knock 
arrangement; and subsequent cases have made it clear that for the same reason 
where liability cover is limited the insurer also owes at least some duty not to 
compromise the assured's position as regards uninsured liabilities.37 Again, where an 
insured has been guilty of non-disclosure but the insurer has “blind-eye” knowledge 
of other facts which might make that non-disclosure innocuous, then there are 
suggestions in the Court of Appeal that it may be contrary to good faith for the latter 
to avoid, at least without consulting the insured.38 This may or may not be academic 
                                                                                                                                       
right other than rescission.” Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] C.L.C. 671 at 680 (Lord 
Bingham MR). 
34 For suggestive remarks in this connection, see e.g., Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] 
C.L.C. 671 at 680 (Lord Bingham MR); Merc-Skandia XXXXII v. Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters (The 
Mercandian Continent) [2001] EWCA Civ. 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563, at [11] and [22] 
(Longmore LJ); Trans-Pacific Ins Co (Aus) Ltd v Grand Union Insurance Co Ltd (1989) 18 
N.S.W.L.R. 675, at 704–705 (Giles J). True, in The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 A.C. 469 
counsel accepted at [49], and Lord Hobhouse suggested at [81], not only that damages were not 
available, but that avoidance was the only remedy that was; similar suggestions appear in CGU 
Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 C.L.R. 1 at [126] (Kirby J). But this 
was not necessary to either decision, and no other remedies were in play. 
35 [1939] 1 K.B. 194: compare more recently Ace Insurance Ltd v Metropolitan Electrical Appliance 
Manufacturing Ltd [2009] HKCFI 1132 (where the duty was accepted but found not broken). Note, 
however, some doubts about how far this concerns the duty of utmost good faith: see Zurich 
Australian Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd (2007) 209 F.L.R. 247 at [264]. 
36 Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 K.B. 194 at 203 (Lord Greene MR); also at 223 (Scott LJ). See too Cox 
v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] C.L.C. 671 (CA) at 680 (Lord Bingham MR); Cormack v 
Washbourne [2000] C.L.C. 1039 (CA), at 1048 (Auld LJ). Sometimes, indeed, this may be 
expressly provided: an example is the asbestos liability policy in issue in Federal Mogul Asbestos 
Personal Injury Trust v Federal-Mogul Ltd [2014] EWHC 2002 (Comm); [2014] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 
671, requiring the defence to be conducted “in a businesslike manner in the spirit of good faith 
and fair dealing, having regard to the legitimate interests of the parties to this Policy and of the 
reinsurers thereof.” 
37 Cormack v Washbourne [2000] C.L.C. 1039 at 1048 (Auld LJ); The Mercandian Continent [2001] 
EWCA Civ. 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563 at [22] (Longmore LJ). See too the Australian decision 
in Distillers Co Bio-Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 C.L.R. 1 at [51] 
(Stephen J).  
38 Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834; [2004] Q.B. 601 at [87] 
and [91] (Rix LJ), at [144] (Clarke LJ) and at [177] (Pill LJ). Here the assured was a motorist who 
failed to disclose a speeding conviction. Under the rating system used by the insurer the non-
in connection with avoidance:39 but it may well be relevant elsewhere, for example 
where in a given case an insurer has the right to cancel the contract for the future40 
or demand extra precautions be taken.41 The precise ambit of the application of the 
good faith principle in this connection is uncertain. For example, it has been said not 
to apply where liability insurers stipulate that settlements of third-party claims will not 
be honoured unless previously approved; these have been held subject simply to the 
general contractual rule that discretions of this kind must not be exercised 
capriciously or arbitrarily, and not to any further demand that they be exercised with 
regard to the assured's own interests.42 Nevertheless, the fact that it applies to at 
least some specific rights seems clear. 
 
  
 
Utmost good faith outside present applications 
 
The duty of good faith may affect (i) the duty to exercise at least some particular 
rights with a view to the other's interests, (ii) a duty to correct mistakes, (iii) some 
aspects of the duty to provide information during the policy, and possibly, (iv) a duty 
to minimise loss. It seems, however, that there is no reason to regard these as 
closed categories. At a later stage it is worth asking how, if at all, the duty of utmost 
faith might be generalised – a matter of some interest, raising issues not only of 
possible analogies from other contracts classified, with insurance, as contracts of the 
utmost good faith, but also of recent developments in the field of good faith generally 
in English law.43 
 
(i) Exercise of rights 
 
There is no doubt that the duty of utmost good faith continues even after the insurer 
has committed itself. It is true that (apparently because of the reduced need for co-
                                                                                                                                       
disclosure would have amounted to an increase in the premium only if the  assured’s wife, who 
was a named driver on the policy, was involved in an accident where she was at fault. In fact, the 
assured’s wide was involved in an accident which initially was recorded as a fault incident on the 
broker’s computer system but the claim was later settled in the favour of the assured’s wife and 
the incident was classified as a non-fault incident in the system. After the insurer became aware of 
the speeding conviction it sought to avoid the policy for non-disclosure, but the Court of Appeal 
held that it could not. These dicta were referred to with apparent approval by Rix LJ in Wise 
(Underwriting Agency) Ltd & Ors v Grupo Nacional Provincial SA [2004] EWCA Civ. 962; [2004] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 483 at [48].   
39 It does not contravene s. 14 of the 2015 Act, since that only proscribes the remedy of avoidance 
for lack of good faith, whereas the remedy here is the opposite: disallowance of an otherwise valid 
avoidance. But it is arguable that the whole field should now be regarded as pre-empted by Part 
2. 
40 This is different from the right to avoid, which has the effect of disentitling the assured to claim in 
respect of losses already incurred. 
41 Commonplace in fire policies over commercial premises, where the insurer is given the right by 
notice to demand remediation of subsequently appearing fire hazards. 
42 Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1047; [2001] Lloyd's Rep. 
I.R. 667 (a reinsurance case); also Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell [2003] EWHC 2224 
(Comm); [2004] 1 C.L.C. 926 at [54] (Longmore LJ). Contra, however, the Australian decision in 
Distillers Co Bio-Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 C.L.R. 1 (decided 
at common law before the changes introduced by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)). 
43 The Mercandian Continent [2001] EWCA Civ. 1275, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563 at [22] (Longmore 
LJ) . 
operation at this stage) the duty is less exacting after that time (and in some respects 
amounts to little more than a prohibition on actual fraud).44 Nevertheless, the 
argument that one party needs extended protection from self-interest, and where 
necessary the fulfilment of positive duties and the demonstration of something more 
than a simple absence of bad faith,45 may still convincingly apply in a number of 
specific instances. Take, for example, the case where a liability insurer has the right 
to conduct litigation for the defence. There may be a need for at least some control 
here to protect the interests of the insured: as the Court of Appeal has put it, the 
insurer's discretion will protect it only “provided that they do so in what they bona fide 
consider to be the common interest of themselves and their assured.”46 Thus where 
cover is limited the insurer must be under some duty, in conducting the defence, not 
to compromise the assured's position as regards uninsured liabilities;47 and indeed in 
Groom v Crocker48 the Court of Appeal took the view that it was unacceptable for an 
insurer to admit fault by the assured when the object was not tactical litigation but 
instead the desire not to imperil the insurer's own knock-for-knock arrangements with 
another provider. Conversely, where a liability insurer agrees to meet the costs of a 
settlement by the insured, the latter cannot claim indemnity if he was not acting in 
good faith towards the insurer or knowingly sacrificed the insurer's interests to his 
own.49 Again, where an insured has been guilty of non-disclosure but the insurer has 
“blind-eye” knowledge of other facts which might make that non-disclosure 
innocuous, the Court of Appeal has said that it may be contrary to utmost good faith 
for the insurer to avoid, at least without consulting the insured.50 This latter instance 
is possibly academic today in so far as it applies to avoidance:51 but it may well be 
                                            
44 The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 A.C. 469 at [72] and [111] (Lord Hobhouse and Lord Scott 
of Foscote respectively). See too the earlier Alfred McAlpine plc v BAI (Run-Off) Ltd [2000] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 437, at 441 (Waller LJ). 
45 “[M]uch more than an absence of bad faith is required of both parties to all contracts of insurance” 
(Stephenson LJ in CTI Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Assn (Bermuda) Ltd [1984] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 476, at 525). The pointed reference to “both parties” shows that this cannot be limited to the 
duty of fair presentation by the insured. 
46 Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 K.B. 194 (CA), at 203 (Greene MR); also at 223 (Scott LJ). See too 
Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] C.L.C. 671 (CA), at 680 (Bingham MR); Cormack v 
Washbourne [2000] C.L.C. 1039 (CA), at 1048 (Auld LJ); Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1 V.R. 427, at 
440. Sometimes, indeed, this may be expressly provided: an example is the asbestos liability 
policy in issue in Federal Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust v Federal-Mogul Ltd [2014] EWHC 
2002 (Comm); [2014] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 671 requiring the defence to be conducted “in a 
businesslike manner in the spirit of good faith and fair dealing, having regard to the legitimate 
interests of the parties to this Policy and of the reinsurers thereof.” 
47 Cormack v Washbourne [2000] C.L.C. 1039 (CA), at 1048 (Auld LJ); The Mercandian Continent 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563 at [22] (Longmore LJ). See too the Australian 
decision in Distillers Co Bio-Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 C.L.R. 1 
at [51] (Stephen J).  
48 [1939] 1 K.B. 194 (CA). Note, however, some doubts about how far this concerns the duty of 
utmost good faith: see Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd 
(2007) 209 F.L.R. 247 at [264]. 
49 Broadlands Properties Ltd v Guardian Assurance Company Ltd (1984) 3 A.N.Z. Insurance Cases 
60–552 at 78,323–78,325. 
50 Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834; [2004] Q.B. 601 at [87] 
and [91] (Rix LJ), [144] (Clarke LJ) and [177] (Pill LJ). These dicta were referred to with apparent 
approval by Rix LJ in Wise (Underwriting Agency) Ltd & Ors v Grupo Nacional Provincial SA 
[2004] EWCA Civ 962; [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 483 at [48].  
51 Since it is arguable that the whole field should now be regarded as pre-empted by Part 2 of the 
2015 Act. Note that it is unaffected by the general prohibition in s. 14 of the 2015 Act, because 
relevant elsewhere, for example where in a given case an insurer has the right to  
demand extra precautions be taken and if they are not to cancel cover for the 
future.52 The precise ambit of the application of the good faith principle in this 
connection is uncertain.53 For example, it has been said not to apply where liability 
insurers stipulate that settlements of third-party claims will not be honoured unless 
previously approved; these have been held subject simply to the general contractual 
rule that discretions of this kind must not be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily, and 
not to any further demand that they be exercised with regard to the assured's own 
interests.54 Nevertheless, the fact that it applies to at least some specific rights 
seems clear. 
 
 
(ii) A duty to correct mistakes 
 
In CTI Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Assn (Bermuda) Ltd,55 Parker LJ, in the 
course of discussing fair presentation and the duty of utmost good faith, made it 
clear that the latter was potentially open-ended. “If,” he said, “the assured or his 
broker realized in the course of negotiations that the insurer had made a serious 
arithmetical mistake or was proceeding upon a mistake of fact with regard to past 
experience he would, under s. 17 [of the MIA 1906], be obliged to draw attention to 
the matter.” It is true that the actual scenario proposed by Parker LJ is now 
academic, since he clearly had in mind allowing the insurer to avoid if the mistake 
was acquiesced in, and that is now barred by s. 14. However, it is perfectly possible 
to think of analogous cases that would not be, and where a good-faith duty to inform 
would be entirely plausible. Suppose, for example, that the subject matter of the 
insurance (for example, the identity of an offshore platform, or the address of 
commercial premises) is misstated in error, so that on a strict reading of the policy 
the insurance never attaches at all. It must now be highly arguable that if the insurer 
realises that there is probably a mistake, his obligation of utmost good faith will 
prevent him using the erroneous description at a later stage to decline liability. Again, 
imagine that payment of claims is made conditional on given information being 
provided about the loss by a given date. If the description of the loss is obviously 
defective owing to forgetfulness or error, it may well be that here too good faith must 
preclude the insurer from simply acquiescing in the mistake and then refusing 
payment on the basis that no adequate information was received. Yet again, 
                                                                                                                                       
although that proscribes the use of utmost good faith as a basis for avoidance, it says nothing 
about its converse use as a ground for preventing avoidance. 
52 A not uncommon provision in in fire policies over commercial premises, where the insurer is given 
the right by notice to demand remediation of subsequently appearing fire hazards. For an example 
see Ground Gilbey Ltd v Jardine Lloyd Thompson UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 124 (Comm); [2011] 
P.N.L.R. 15.  
53 For example, Pill LJ, in Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc [2003] EWCA Civ. 1834; 
[2004] Q.B. 601 at [177]-[178] was adamant that continuing duty of good faith can be breached by 
the insurer even in the absence of fraud. 
54 Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1047; [2001] Lloyd's Rep. 
I.R. 667 (a reinsurance case). Contra, however, the Australian decision in Distillers Co Bio-
Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 C.L.R. 1 (decided at common law 
before the changes introduced by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)). 
55 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476. See too Stephenson LJ at 525: “[T]he principle [of utmost good faith] 
would therefore protect a party who had made a fundamental error such as overestimating the 
average book value per container against a party who had noticed the mistake and let it go 
uncorrected.” 
suppose that in filling in a complex proposal form for property insurance a proposer 
states a value which is obviously too low and fairly clearly unintended: would the 
insurer be allowed to accept the proposal, say nothing, and then reduce any 
payment for under-insurance? It seems unlikely.56 In all probability an estoppel in 
such cases would preclude insurer from relying upon a policy term or the right that 
might otherwise be open to him.57 In this context the scope of the duty is a bit more 
certain in the sense that for the duty to bite it is essential that the insurer is aware (or 
turns a blind eye) to the fact that the assured is operating under a mistaken view as 
to the need for a policy itself or its coverage.     
 
(iii)  Provision of information 
 
The most obvious case of provision of information after conclusion of the contract 
possibly being bound up with the duty of utmost good faith are the rules on 
subsequent modifications and fraudulent claims. But these are not relevant to this 
article, since (a) as regards subsequent modifications it seems clear that Part 2 of 
the 2015 Act claims the whole field;58 (b) there is some doubt whether the rule as to 
fraudulent claims is in fact an outgrowth of utmost good faith;59 and (c) in any case 
this latter area is also now pre-empted by Part 3 of the Insurance Act 2015 to the 
exclusion of any common-law remedy. Nevertheless, there is authority that utmost 
good faith may go further than this. First, where the terms or circumstances of the 
insurance contract require information to be provided during the contract in order to 
inform a decision by the insurer, the knowing provision of false information or 
fraudulent non-disclosure of relevant facts may amount to a breach of the duty of 
good faith.60 And secondly, while the courts will not infer as a matter of course a duty 
in an insured to keep his insurer informed,61 good faith may in special circumstances 
give rise to one. Thus in the Court of Appeal decision in Alfred McAlpine plc v BAI 
                                            
56 All three of these scenarios derive from real cases in civil law jurisdictions, also involving the 
application of the analogous obligation of good faith (there a general provision) to insurance 
contracts. In every case it was decided after argument that good faith prevented the insurer from 
declining liability or reducing recovery, as the case might be. See, respectively, the decisions of 
the supreme courts of Switzerland (22.10.1964, ATF 90 II 449) and Germany (BGH 14.11.1979, IV 
ZR 41/78; VersR 80, 159 and BGH 7.12.1988 - IVa ZR 193/87). The issue of how far general rules 
on good faith may be relevant to the discussion in this article is discussed in some detail below. 
57  Sherdley v Nordea Life and Pensions SA [2012] EWCA Civ. 88; [2012] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 437. 
58 Save possibly in the case of held covered clauses, where in given circumstances the underwriter 
is bound willy-nilly to extend cover on demand at a reasonable premium (see Liberian Insurance 
Agency Inc v Mosse [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 560 at 566–568 (Donaldson J)). On a strict reading the 
operation of such a clause does not lead to a variation of the insurance contract within s. 2(2) of 
the 2015 Act but simply to the evolution of new rights and duties arising out of the contract in its 
original form. It is to be hoped that the courts would avoid such a crabbed interpretation, but it 
remains perfectly plausible. 
59 Doubtful: The Star Sea [2001] 1 UKHL 1; [2003] 1 A.C. 469 at [102] (Lord Scott); The Mercandian 
Continent [2001] EWCA Civ. 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563 at [11] and [22] (Longmore LJ). 
60 So held in New Zealand: see National Insurance Co Ltd v Van Gameren [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 374 
(though explicitly no finding of a fraudulent claim, false statements by insured as to whether he 
had been drinking constitute a breach of duty of utmost good faith justifying refusal of indemnity). 
This seems the best explanation of the otherwise difficult decision in The Litsion Pride [1985] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 437. 
61 A proposition put beyond doubt in New Hampshire Insurance Co v MGN Ltd [1997] L.R.L.R. 24 
(CA), at 58–61 (Staughton LJ). See too NSW Medical Defence Union v Transport Industries 
Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 107. The converse is also it seems true: good faith gives 
rise to  no general duty on an insurer to keep the insured informed. See Plaza Fiberglass 
Manufacturing Ltd v Cardinal Insurance Co (1994) 115 D.L.R. (4th) 37. 
(Run-Off) Ltd,62 concerning failure to keep a liability insurer properly informed, Waller 
LJ seemingly accepted that deliberate concealment or misinformation might be a 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith.63 And in Phoenix General Insurance Co v 
Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd64 Hobhouse J took the view that where the 
circumstances demanded it – particularly in the case of liability insurance and 
reinsurance – there would be an obligation arising out of good faith to keep adequate 
records and make them available to the insurer (or reinsurer) in order to allow the 
latter to keep track of his liabilities.65 It was not made clear what the remedy would 
be in such a case, but it seems from later authority that there is no reason why 
remedies other than avoidance should not be available.66 
 
 
(iv) A duty to minimise loss 
 
An insured is, it seems clear, not under any general duty to look to his insurer's 
interests when conducting his affairs. Thus it is clear that he is under no duty (unless 
by express provision) to take care to avoid a loss,67 and can generally exercise rights 
under the contract entirely in his own interests.68 Nevertheless, there may be limits to 
this immunity. What if an insured knowingly and without good reason sees a loss 
about to occur and takes no steps whatever to prevent or minimise it? There is 
Australian authority at common law that this may amount to a breach of his duty of 
good faith;69 and one New Zealand case illustrates the matter neatly. In UEB 
Packaging Ltd v QBE Insurance Ltd70 an insured under a liability policy failed to tell 
the insurer of a possible claim; as a result the insurer lost the ability to take over the 
                                            
62 [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 437. 
63  [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 437 at 441. No such deliberate act was present. On this see too The 
Mercandian Continent [2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 563 at [11] and [22] 
(Longmore LJ). 
64 [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 599. 
65 Ibid., 614. This was apparently approved by Lord Scott in The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 
A.C. 469 at [81].  
66 The Mercandian Continent [2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563, at [22] (Longmore 
LJ).  
67 Reflected in the long-standing rule that negligence in the assured does not bar his right to claim: 
see, e.g., Dixon v Sadler (1839) 5 M. & W. 405 at 414 (Parke B); Trinder Anderson & Co v 
Thames & Mersey Marine Assurance Co [1898] 2 Q.B. 114. It should be noted that for contracts 
that come under the scope of the MIA 1906, such a duty is imposed on the assured by virtue of s. 
78(4) of the Act. 
68 An example being fac/oblig reinsurance: as Lord Millett put it in Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting 
Ltd v Johnson & Higgins Ltd [2001] UKHL 51; [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 157, at [71], “Fac/oblig 
treaties are naturally less attractive to reinsurers than quota share treaties. They are subject to the 
obvious risk that the insurer will retain good business for his own account and cede poor business 
to the treaty. There is, or at least is assumed to be, no obligation of good faith on the part of the 
ceding party when exercising his discretion whether to cede or retain a risk. The only constraint 
upon him is that he must exercise some restraint if he wishes to maintain a good reputation in the 
market and any hope of doing future business with existing and prospective reinsurers.” 
69 Re Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [1999] 2 Qd. R. 203, 210 (Chesterman J); also the earlier 
Newnham v Baker [1989] 1 Qd. R. 393, at 399 (Derrington J), accepting that medical insurance 
implicitly required, as a matter of utmost good faith, reasonably prompt treatment; also AFG 
Insurances Ltd v City of Brighton (1973) 126 C.L.R. 655; D. Derrington & R. Ashton, The Law of 
Liability Insurance (3rd ed., Sydney, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013), at 4-3. Contra, admittedly, 
dicta of Scrutton LJ in City Tailors Ltd v Evans (1922) 91 L.J.K.B. 379, at 385, accepting the duty 
but putting it on causation grounds. 
70 [1996] 2 N.Z.L.R. 467. 
defence, and judgment went by default against the insured. Baragwanath J held the 
insured in breach of the duty of utmost good faith and hence unable to claim.71 
However, it should be noted that even if in the absence of an intervention from the 
doctrine of good faith, the assured would presumably be deprived of his right to 
indemnity in a case where the existence of a causal link between the loss and 
breach of the duty to minimise or avert loss could be established.72 Therefore, it is 
debateable whether the duty of good faith adds much in this context.         
 
 
IV) IN SEARCH OF OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES – SOME POSSIBLE GUIDES 
 
 
What can we make of these decisions, apart from the fact that they show that there 
are at least some cases where the courts have recognised a continuing utmost good 
faith duty in circumstances which remain unaffected by the changes introduced by 
the 2015 Act?73 It would be possible to regard them as simply disjointed instances, 
once tacked on to the duty to disclose as a kind of afterthought, and now left high, 
dry and anomalous after the hiving-off of the “duty of fair presentation” to a modern 
statutory regime. But while this is a tenable attitude, it is suggested that we can do 
better. A more constructive approach would be to build on these authorities, with a 
view to formulating a useful general principle on the duties of parties to an insurance 
contract to forward the aims of that contract. In seeking to do this, there are three 
helpful guides. The first of these is the developing Australian jurisprudence on the 
definition of utmost good faith, following the rejuvenation of the topic by 
Commonwealth legislation dating from 1984. The second is the treatment of the 
concept of utmost good faith in other contracts classified as requiring it, notably 
partnership contracts. The third is the development of ideas of good faith in a more 
general sense in English contract law and elsewhere.   
 
 
Other contracts requiring utmost good faith 
 
In English law the requirement of utmost good faith traditionally characterises not 
only insurance, but a category of contracts of which insurance is merely the most 
important. As for which contracts fall in this class, these have been said at various 
times to include not only insurance but contracts for the sale of land, contracts of 
suretyship, compromises, composition deeds, partnership agreements, and any 
contract made against the background of a fiduciary relationship.74 However, before 
                                            
71 [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 467 at  479. The case concerned a direct claim against the insurer under the NZ 
equivalent of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930. See too another example given 
by Stephen J in the High Court of Australia in Distillers Co Bio-chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ajax 
Insurance Co Ltd (1972) 130 C.L.R. 1 at 32: an insured who settled a claim against himself on the 
basis of extraneous considerations, such as the avoidance of bad publicity, might well on that 
basis alone lose any right to indemnity from his liability insurer. 
72 State of the Netherlands v Youell [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 236 (CA). 
73 Unaffected because they are outside both the general pre-emption in Parts 2 and 3 of the law on 
fair presentation and fraudulent claims, and also the general s. 14 prohibition on avoidance 
74 A.K. Turner, Spencer Bower & Turner on Actionable Non-disclosure (2nd ed., London, 
Butterworths, 1990), at 5-01. See however Chitty on Contracts (31st ed., London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012), at 6–150, which by doubting whether anything other than insurance is a contract 
discussing this class a word of caution is needed. The subject is normally discussed 
with regard only to the duty of disclosure and the exceptions to the rule that mere 
silence does not count as a misstatement.75 Furthermore, even here land sales,76 
suretyship77 and compromise78 are very doubtful; and while fiduciary relationships 
undoubtedly can carry protective equitable duties to disclose, they seem to have little 
in common with insurance.  
 
We are, therefore, left in effect with partnership and composition deeds.79 As regards 
the former, there is no doubt that this supports a wide interpretation of utmost good 
faith. The obligation between partners extends well beyond a pre-contractual duty of 
disclosure,80 to encompass a post-contract duty of general co-operation in operating 
the business and determining and distributing each partner's share in its assets.81 It 
also operates to prevent the invocation of apparently unlimited rights where abusive 
and contrary to the spirit of the agreement; so (for instance) a power to expel a 
partner “cannot be relied upon unless there is good faith; it cannot be used if the 
motive is really to get an undue advantage over the other partner by purchasing him 
out on unfavourable terms.”82 More generally, in an analogous joint venture 
agreement embodying an explicit obligation of “utmost good faith” 83 the duty 
between partners was interpreted expansively as one “to observe reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in accordance with their actions that related to 
the agreement”, requiring “faithfulness to the agreed common purpose and 
consistency with the [counterparty's] justified expectations”.84 In addition, in 
                                                                                                                                       
uberrimae fidei in the strict sense, comes close to denying the existence of the category 
altogether.  
75 See e.g., Chitty on Contracts (31st ed), at [6-150]; M.Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (2nd ed., 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), at pp. 208–209. 
76 See Spooner v Eustace [1963] N.Z.L.R. 913; A.K. Turner, Spencer Bower & Turner on Actionable 
Non-disclosure (2nd ed.), at [7–17]; also cf C. Harpum, “Selling without Title: A Vendor's Duty of 
Disclosure?” (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 280, at p. 318. 
77 “A suretyship contract is not a contract uberrimae fidei” –  Lord Scott in Royal Bank of Scotland 
Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 A.C. 773, at [185]; also North Shore Ventures Ltd v 
Anstead Holdings Inc  [2011] EWCA Civ. 230; [2012] Ch 31 at [14] (Morritt C). See too A.K. 
Turner, Spencer Bower & Turner on Actionable Non-disclosure (2nd ed), at [8-02] – [8-03]. 
78 Turner v Green [1895] 2 Ch. 205; Wales v Wadham [1977] 1 W.L.R. 199, at 214–215 (Tudor 
Evans J) (overruled in Livesey v Jenkins [1985] A.C. 424, but on other grounds); D. Foskett, The 
Law of Compromise (6th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at [4–38]. 
79 Family arrangements theoretically are also contracts uberrimae fidei; but since all the cases deal 
with the ability to avoid them in the event of non-disclosure they do not take this discussion any 
further and can be left aside. 
80 Which does exist: e.g., Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] A.C. 161 at 227 (Lord Atkin); Conlon v Simms 
[2006] EWCA Civ. 1749; [2008] 1 W.L.R. 484 at [127] (Jonathan Parker LJ). 
81 A partner is “bound in all transactions affecting the partnership, to do his best for the common 
body” –  Lindley & Banks on Partnership (19th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at [16-14]. 
See too Golstein v Bishop [2013] EWHC 881 (Ch); [2014] Ch. 131, at [136] (Christopher Nugee 
QC). The discussion there was of an express duty of utmost good faith, but (it is suggested) 
nothing turns on this. 
82 Green v Howell [1910] 1 Ch. 495 at 504 (Cozens-Hardy MR). See too Blisset v Daniel (1853) 10 
Hare 493, and more recently cf Lie v Mohile [2015] EWHC 200 (Ch) and Johnson v Snaddon 
[2001] VSCA 91. 
83 Increasingly common: for two recent examples see Berkeley Community Villages Ltd v Pullen 
[2007] EWHC 1330 (Ch), [2007] 3 E.G.L.R. 101 and CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate 
Investment Co [2010] EWHC 1535 (Ch) (both cases of joint development ventures). 
84 See Berkeley Community Villages Ltd v Pullen [2007] EWHC 1330 (Ch); [2007] 3 E.G.L.R. 101 at 
[97] (Morgan J).  
partnership law courts happily seem to contemplate remedies other than avoidance 
in the event of breach of the duty:85 for example, the inability to enforce or exercise 
rights,86 or to plead what would otherwise amount to a defence to a claim.87 
Compositions with creditors are a less fruitful source of case-law on utmost good 
faith, since the scope for breach is narrow: it is essentially limited to the hiding or 
conclusion of side agreements with the debtor with a view to getting an unfair 
advantage over other creditors.88 But they do also confirm that remedies for breach 
other than escape from the agreement may be possible. Thus there is old authority 
that a hidden arrangement of this sort cannot be enforced against the debtor;89 and 
an Australian court has made suggestions seeming to indicate that a restitutionary 
remedy may be available to the other creditors.90  
 
 
Australian jurisprudence 
 
Before the enactment of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 at the federal level, 
Australian authority on utmost good faith was uninformative. It largely aped English 
case-law on pre-contract disclosure: with a few exceptions91 there was little if 
anything about the more esoteric parts of the doctrine. The 1984 Act sought to 
change this in two ways: first, by making utmost good faith an implied obligation in 
every insurance contract;92 and secondly, by barring reliance on any provision of an 
insurance contract where such reliance would amount to a lack of utmost good 
faith.93 The concept itself, however, remained deliberately and pointedly undefined. 
Hence the definition of the conduct that will trigger the application of the 1984 Act is 
presumably unchanged from the common law; from which it follows that authorities 
on it remain highly relevant to the present discussion.94 And these authorities, while 
accepting that characterising utmost good faith is a highly fact-specific exercise,95 
                                            
85 United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 C.L.R. 1, at 6 (Gibbs CJ). 
86 As in United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 C.L.R. 1 (no enforcement of 
mortgage held by partner in breach of duty of utmost good faith). The expulsion cases in note  
above are another instance. 
87 Clements v Hall (1858) 2 De. G. & J. 173;  44 E.R. 954 (otherwise clear defence of laches barred 
to defendant guilty of non-disclosure). 
88 E.g., Britten v Hughes (1829) 5 Bing 460; 130 E.R. 1139; Fisher (ET) and Co Pty Ltd v English 
Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 C.L.R. 84. 
89 Britten v Hughes (1829) 5 Bing. 460; 130 E.R. 1139. 
90 The law “will not allow him to recover or retain any such secret benefit”: see Williams J. in Fisher 
(ET) & Co Pty Ltd v English Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 C.L.R. 84 at 103 (emphasis 
added). See too McKewan v Sanderson (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 65. 
91 For example, the suggestive statement of Chesterman J about a possible duty to mitigate loss in 
Re Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [1999] 2 Qd. R. 203, 210. 
92 Section 13. The duty applies, understandably, throughout the currency of the contract (Camellia 
Properties Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2013] N.S.W.S.C. 1975 at [109]). It is 
enforceable not only by parties to the contract but, since the Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 
2013, by third party beneficiaries and also by administrative intervention; see now ss. 13(3), 13(4) 
and14A.  
93 Section 14. On the reforms see generally M. Mills, “Duty of Good Faith: The ‘Sleeper’ of Insurance 
Obligations?” (2006) 80 A.L.J. 387 and K. Lewins, “Going Walkabout with Australian Insurance 
Law: The Australian Experience of Reforming Utmost Good Faith” [2013] J.B.L. 1. 
94 See e.g., B. McGivern, “Coming to the Party: The Evolution of Post-contractual Duties of Good 
Faith under the ICA” (2013) Ins. L.J. 159, at p. 164. 
95 S. Drummond, “Unconscionable Conduct and Utmost Good Faith” (2003) 14 Ins. L.J. 208, at p. 
210 (utmost good faith “varies according to the context”). For another spirited attack on over-
show a clear tendency has been towards an expansive interpretation. Typical 
formulations are in terms of notions of “fairness, reasonableness and community 
standards of decency and fair dealing”;96 a duty “not to 'snap up' bargains, not to 
'stretch' ... undertakings in ways which the promisee knows or suspects the promisor 
did not intend”; “not to insist upon full enforcement when doing so would mean truly 
intolerable imposition”;97 an obligation not to use contractual powers for furtherance 
of an ulterior and unintended purpose;98 or (in the insurer's case) a duty “to act, 
consistently with commercial standards of decency and fairness, with due regard to 
the interests of the insured”.99 Furthermore, although failure to show utmost good 
faith apparently stops short of encompassing omissions to act caused by pure 
inadvertence,100 there is certainly no need for deliberate dishonesty;101 caprice and 
unreasonableness, even without moral obliquity, may suffice.102 Descending to 
specifics, it has been held or accepted that a failure in utmost good faith can be 
evidenced on the insurers' side by such matters as failure to warn an insured of an 
unexpected exclusion of cover;103 defending a claim on the insured's behalf with an 
undisclosed intention to indemnify only if liability is established on one specific basis 
out of several pleaded;104 delay in making payment on clearly inadequate 
grounds;105 and, where the insurer's power to determine facts relevant to liability 
makes it judge in its own cause, deciding the matter capriciously106 or on the basis of 
information available only to it without allowing the insured any chance to access or 
rebut it.107 On the insured's side, the obligation has been held to encompass 
dishonest reticence when claiming on a policy, even where this does not amount to 
                                                                                                                                       
generalisation in this context, see the perceptive judgment of Chesterman J in Re Zurich 
Australian Insurance Ltd [1999] 2 Qd. R. 203, at 217. 
96 See the WA case of Kelly v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 130 F.L.R. 97, at 111 (Owen J). 
Similarly see Edwards v Hunter Valley Co-op Dairy Co Ltd (1992) 7 A.N.Z. Ins. Cas. 61–113 at 
77,536–77,537 (McClelland J: “good faith and fair dealing”); Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v 
Sayseng [2005] N.S.W.C.A. 214; 13 A.N.Z. Insurance Cases 90–123 at [54]–[56] (Santow J: ditto, 
though strictly not a decision under the 1984 Act). 
97 ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of 
Australasia Ltd 2006 V.S.C. 507 at [863]. 
98 ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of 
Australasia Ltd 2006 V.S.C. 507 at [862]. 
99  CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 C.L.R. 1 at [15] (Gleeson CJ 
and Crennan J). 
100 CIC Insurance Ltd v Barwon Region Water Authority (1989) 10 A.N.Z.I.C. 61-425, at 74,773 – 
74,774. 
101  CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 C.L.R. 1 at [15] (Gleeson CJ 
and Crennan J); Speno Rail Maintenance Australia Pty Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd 
(2009) 226 F.L.R. 306 at [152] (Beech AJA). 
102  CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 C.L.R. 1 at [131] (Kirby J, 
dissenting but not on this point); also at [15] (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J) and [257] (Callinan and 
Heydon JJ). See too in WA Kelly v NZ Ins Co Ltd (1994) 9 A.N.Z. Ins. C. 31-167 at 76,520 (Owen 
J). 
103 Australian Associated Motor Insurance Ltd v Ellis (1990) 54 S.A.S.R. 61 (car insurance: fitting of 
alloy wheels). 
104 Nigel Watts Fashion Agencies Pty Ltd v Forbes (1995) 8 A.N.Z. Ins. C. 61-235; A.C.N. 007 838 
584 Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1997) 69 S.A.S.R. 374. 
105 Moss v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1990) 55 S.A.S.R. 145, esp at 154. So too at common law, 
according to one New Zealand court: Stuart v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Co of NZ Ltd 
(No 2) (1988) 5 A.N.Z.Ins.C. 60-844. 
106 Lockwood v Insurance Australia Ltd (2010) 107 S.A.S.R. 299 at [27]. 
107 Beverley v Tyndall Life Insurance Co Ltd (1999) 21 W.A.R. 327, esp at 329–333 (Malcolm CJ); 
338, at 347–348 (Ipp J). See too Chammas v Harwood Nominees Pty Ltd (1993) 7 A.N.Z. Ins. C. 
61-175. 
the making of a fraudulent claim,108 and (it would seem) use of insurance products 
for purposes they were never envisaged to serve.109   
 
 
 
 
Good faith generally 
 
One might have thought that “utmost good faith” would be informed at least in part by 
the more general idea of ordinary “good faith”,110 especially since it is not entirely 
easy to see what the word “utmost” adds anyway. In England, however, apart from a 
few dicta,111 this did not happen. This may look curious but is entirely 
understandable, given the lack of any general duty of good faith in English contract 
law as a whole. There is no reason why this state of affairs should continue. There 
are at least two reasons for this: first, the increasing acceptance of good faith in 
common law (especially Commonwealth) jurisdictions,112 and secondly, possible 
analogies from elsewhere. Both could do with a brief look. 
   
As regards contracts generally, it seems at least a limited duty of good faith in 
commercial contracts now applies in Canada113 and Australia.114 This is significant, 
because there is some indication that in both cases this growing line of authority on 
general good faith has begun to seep into discussion of utmost good faith in 
insurance cases.115 Thus in Australia a statement that parties to an insurance 
contract had under the rubric of utmost good faith to observe “fairness, 
                                            
108  NZ Ins Co Ltd v Forbes (1988) 5 ANZIC 60-871; Norwood v Ian Dickson Ltd (1993) 7 A.N.Z.Ins.C. 
61-176 at 78,004 – 78,005. So also in New Zealand at common law: National Insurance Co Ltd v 
van Gameren [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 374 at 378–379 (Smellie J). 
109  For example, the use of a unit-based life insurance policy as a means of risk-free arbitrage, at 
least where the insured knew that the insurer did not envisage such operations: A.C.N. 074 971 
109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd 2006 
V.S.C. 507 at [859]–[894] (appealed on other grounds at (2008) 21 V.R. 351). 
110  As in Scotland, where in a series of early cases judges regularly used the term uberrima fides to 
characterise contracts which the Romans called contracts bonae fidei. See e.g., Menzies v 
Menzies (1712) 4 Bro. Sup. 899, at 900 (arguendo) (“emption vendition is contractus uberrimae 
fidei, to be regulated secundum bonum et aequum”); also the earlier Oxford (Viscount) v Watson 
(1701) 4 Bro Sup 512, and Corbet v Cochran (1707) 4 Bro Sup 678 (“maritime contracts are 
optimae et uberrimae fidei”).  
111  Including a well-known line from Lord Mansfield himself in Carter v. Boehm itself: see (1766) 3 
Burr. 1905 at 1910; 97 E.R. 1162 at 1164 (“The governing principle is applicable to all contracts 
and dealings. Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the 
other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary”). 
112  Where, interestingly enough, the influence has operated in reverse: utmost good faith in 
insurance has informed the development of more generalised good faith elsewhere. See e.g., 
Bhasin v. Hrynew 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 495 at [35] ff (Cromwell J); and A. Mason, 
“Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 66, at 73. 
113  Bhasin v. Hrynew 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 495.  
114  See Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 N.S.W.L.R. 234, 
268 (Priestley JA), Hughes Aircraft Systems International Ltd v Airservices Australia Ltd (1997) 76 
F.C.R. 151 at 192–193 (Finn J) and the enthusiastic endorsement to be found in J.W. Carter, 
Contract Law in Australia (6th ed., Chatswood NSW, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), Ch 2.  
115  Australia: ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life 
Association of Australasia Ltd 2006 V.S.C. 507 at [860]–[864]; F. Hawke, “Utmost Good Faith -- 
What does it really mean?” (1994) 6 Insurance Law Journal 91. Canada: Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 
SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 495 at [35]–[36], [55] (Cromwell J). 
reasonableness and community standards of decency and fair dealing” towards each 
other was explicitly based on a discussion of good faith in commercial contracts 
generally;116 and similarly the Supreme Court of Canada has suggested that 
contractual good faith may preclude an insurer from denying a claim on entirely 
technical and non-prejudicial grounds.117 In England matters are less certain;118 but it 
is certainly possible for such an obligation to be expressly undertaken,119 and where 
it is, it takes the form of a broad duty to act “honestly and conscionably vis-à-vis the 
other parties”,120 which closely tracks what has been said to be the content of an 
explicit obligation of utmost good faith and is essentially identical to the “obligation to 
observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in accordance with their 
actions that related to the agreement and also requiring faithfulness to the agreed 
common purpose and consistency with the [counterparty's] justified expectations” 
that has been said to characterise an obligation of utmost good faith.121  
  
When it comes to analogies from elsewhere, one European jurisdiction stands out:  
namely Germany, where a general duty of good faith pervades all obligations,122 
including insurance,123 and where the impact of good faith on insurance specifically 
is pervasive, universal and well documented.124 Despite the obvious hazards 
inherent in attempts at cross-jurisdictional transfers, it is suggested that this may 
provide at least some suggestive guidance.  
 
Here, in contrast to the common law position, much of the authority concerns the 
insurer's duty. A few examples can suffice. Insurers are regularly prevented on good 
faith grounds from relying on unusual limitations of cover likely to escape the 
insured's notice unless warned.125 Again, where information provided by a confused 
                                            
116 ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of 
Australasia Ltd 2006 V.S.C. 507 at [863]. 
117  Somersall v. Friedman (2002) 215 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at [52] (Lacobucci J) (technical but harmless 
impairment of subrogation rights). 
118  With the traditional view in ING Bank NV v Ros Roca SA [2011] EWCA Civ 353; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 
472 at [92] (Rix LJ) compare Leggatt J in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] 
EWHC 111 (QB); [2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 526 at [120]–[141]. 
119  See e.g., in the insurance context Federal-Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust v Federal-Mogul 
Ltd (formerly T&N Plc) [2014] EWHC 2002 (Comm); [2014] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 671 (reinsurance: 
claims handling by insured to be “exercised in a businesslike manner in the spirit of good faith and 
fair dealing”). 
120 See [2014] EWHC 2002 (Comm); [2014] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 671 at [119] (Eder J). 
121  CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 C.L.R. 1 at [15] (Gleeson CJ 
and Crennan J). 
122 Under BGB, § 242. 
123  “It is accepted law that the insurance relationship is governed to a peculiar extent by good faith 
and regard for business morality” – a statement frequently made by German courts and quoted, 
with references, in Prölss/Martin, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, (26th ed., Munich, C.H.Beck), 
2015 at p. 40 (authors' translation). In the leading Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, (7th ed., 
Munich, C.H.Beck), 2015, § 242 Rn 460, there is an instructive section on good faith directed 
specifically at insurance. 
124  See Prölss/Martin, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, 26th ed., at 40 ff. 
125  E.g., BGH 09.10.1974, IV ZR 118/73 (roofer's liability policy excluding liability for scaffolding hired 
out); OLG Köln, 17.09.92, VersR 93, 304 (business liability policy: exclusion of liabilities arising 
out of use of vehicles said to include a lawn tractor landscaping the premises); OLG Hamm, 
22.9.1993, 20 U 59/93 (business policy ceased to cover chattels when insured moved premises: 
good-faith duty to warn when insurer found out about move). So too with consumers: BGH 
13.12.1978, IV ZR 177/77 (motor theft policy: good faith duty to warn that clause requiring 
luggage to be in boot meant no coverage when stowed in rear compartment of hatchback). 
insured bears marks of likely inaccuracy, a series of cases precludes reliance on this 
incorrectness to deny cover.126 There is also authority requiring fair and open 
decision-making where a discretion of the insurer is in issue,127 and preventing 
abusive reliance on technical exclusions.128 Furthermore, once the contract is on 
foot, the insurer is bound as a matter of good faith not to use its superior bargaining 
power not to extract a disadvantageous settlement from the insured.129 Nor is this 
duty limited to the insurer: for example, even where cover is ex facie unlimited, the 
requirement of good faith places a duty on the insured to take reasonable steps to 
minimise the amount of any claim.130    
 
 
V) PULLING TOGETHER UTMOST GOOD FAITH IN INSURANCE LAW – 
POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS  
 
In this and the next section we try to pull together the previous paragraphs and look 
at the substantive issue: in the light of developments in England and elsewhere, how 
might the concept of utmost good faith develop? This section will deal with the 
definition of what amounts to utmost good faith: the next, with the possible remedies 
where there is a failure to show it. 
 
As regards the meaning of utmost good faith in the insurance context, it is suggested 
that there are five statements that can be safely made. 
  
First, there is no reason not to accept utmost good faith as a general doctrine, 
applicable to the conduct of both parties alike throughout the insurance relationship. 
Admittedly the common law authorities on post-contract good faith could, if one 
wished, be fitted into distinct categories: for example, provision of information due to 
the insurer, duties in respect of claims management, the duty not simply to 
acquiesce in a mistake, and the need to minimise loss. But there is no reason to do 
so, or to regard these categories as closed. On the contrary, the authorities clearly 
suggest that existing instances are merely examples of a general doctrine open, as 
with common law generally (and in this case the civil law as well), to incremental 
development. 
 
                                            
126 E.g., BGH, 7. 12. 1988, IVa ZR 193/87 (buildings insurance: insured undervalued premises in 
proposal form when he predictably misread fiendishly obscure provision: no reliance on 
underinsurance to reduce claim); BGH 14.11.1979, VersR 80, at 159 (claim conditional on correct 
completion of damage report form on pain of losing claim: error clear: insurer, having failed to 
query it, precluded from refusing payout). 
127  BGH 11.6. 2003, V ZR 418/02; also OLG Frankfurt, 28.5.1991, VersR 92, at 224 (no reliance on 
private medical report not shown to insured to refuse disability cover). See too LG Dortmund, 
21.05.2008, 2 O 400/07 (same report on alleged burglary kept secret by insurer). 
128  BGH 03.10.1984, IVa ZR 76/83 esp [18]; BGH 18.07.2007, IV ZR 129/06 (disability insurance for 
professionals: despite prohibition on working while claiming, no power to cancel when trivial and 
purely ministerial functions performed in relation to profession).  
129  “… [T]he insurer is particularly strongly bound, as a matter of good faith, not to turn its superior 
familiarity with the case and the law to the disadvantage of the insured.” See BGH 30.03.2011: IV 
ZR 269/08, II.2(a) (author's translation); also BGH 28.02.2007: IV ZR 46/06 II.2(a); BGH 
07.02.2007, IV ZR 244/03 (all disability insurance cases).  
130 E.g., BGH, 12. 3. 2003 - IV ZR 278/01 at [37] (medical insurance: no claim for non-vital treatment 
if disproportionately expensive). 
Secondly, the existing categories, while not constrictive, might well nevertheless 
provide a useful guide as to future development. The underlying contract of 
insurance, it is suggested, is best expressed as a co-operative agreement, to be 
construed according to the understanding of reasonable parties, to assess, 
underwrite and pay risks in an efficient, informed and reasonably expeditious way. If 
so, the essential obligation under it, which the duty of utmost good faith should aim 
to support, should be expressed on the lines of a duty to do all that is reasonable, by 
way of provision of information or other facilities, to further the proper performance of 
that contract.131 Such a characterisation would take account of the special nature of 
the insurance contract and its similarity to other co-operative ventures, and go some 
way towards explaining why we regard such contracts as requiring good faith in 
contrast to, say, a time charterparty or a speculative sale of soya beans. It would also 
neatly encapsulate the four forms of the obligation described above. The duties to 
inform and correct mistakes would ensure that performance took place in a properly 
informed manner as expected by the parties; the duty not to misuse rights, and to 
take at least some steps to minimise losses, would be there to ensure that 
performance took place as nearly as possible in accordance with ordinary business 
understanding. 
 
Thirdly, the duty to support performance of the contract should essentially be a duty 
to do all that can reasonably be expected, but no more. Just as the general doctrine 
of good faith, where that is applicable to contracts as a whole, does not demand 
disinterested altruism,132 so also there should be no breach of the duty of utmost 
good faith where a party is acting reasonably or seeking to defend its legitimate 
commercial or other interests. An example would be where an insured purchases a 
fac/oblig facility.133   
 
Fourthly, any duty would clearly be subject to any express or implied contrary 
agreement: to this extent, it would have to be narrower than in the civil law, where 
lawyers are inured to the idea that freedom of contract does not necessarily trump 
good faith. Thus, as held in both Australia and England, insofar as the contract itself, 
the commercial background or the dealings of the parties permits a particular activity 
or means of doing business, there would be no room for a finding of a breach of 
duty; and similarly where, even if the contract did not permit such conduct, it was 
implicitly permitted or acquiesced in by the other party. 
               
                                            
131  Compare Morgan J in Berkeley Community Villages Ltd v Pullen [2007] EWHC 1330; [2007] 3 
E.G.L.R. 101 at [97], construing an express utmost good faith clause as requiring “a contractual 
obligation to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in accordance with their 
actions which related to the Agreement and also requiring faithfulness to the agreed common 
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the [parties]."  
132  “If adherence to such standards of conduct is the predominant component of a separate 
obligation of good faith in performance of a contract, it becomes necessary to enquire about the 
extent to which selflessness is required. It must be accepted that the party subject to the 
obligation is not required to subordinate the party's own interests, so long as pursuit of those 
interests does not entail unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of a benefit conferred by 
the express contractual terms so that the enjoyment becomes (or could become) ... 'nugatory, 
worthless or, perhaps, seriously undermined'” – Overlook Management BV v Foxtel Management 
Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 17 at [65] (Barrett J). 
133  See observations made by Lord Millett in Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & 
Higgins Ltd [2001] UKHL 51; [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 157 at [71]. 
Fifthly, the precise nature of the duty and what is expected of parties should depend 
on the issue at stake. For example, duty to correct a mistake on the part of the 
insurer could arise only in a case where the insurer is aware (or turns a blind eye) to 
the fact that the assured has made a mistake as to the need, nature or scope of the 
cover. Conversely, it is debateable whether the duty of the assured to provide 
information under a contractual provision could be breached in the absence of fraud 
on the part of the assured.134 It is submitted that in some cases misconduct less than 
wilfulness might suffice but that is a matter that depends on the nature of the 
obligation or even type of the insurance contract in question.   
  
 
  
Remedies 
 
It is true that there are suggestions135 that, putting aside the provisions of the 2015 
Act, the only possible remedy for a breach of the duty of utmost good faith is 
avoidance of the contract. But these, as is suggested above, are unconvincing.  
 
It is true that, owing to the decision in Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) 
Insurance Co Ltd136 the award of damages raises special difficulties; hence we must 
leave this aside for a moment. But there is no reason to think that damages and 
avoidance exhaust the possible responses of the law to breaches of good faith 
obligations. It is perfectly plausible for the law to run to other remedies, such as 
inability to exercise rights under the contract, reduction of liability or the loss of the 
right to rely on a limit of liability. Indeed it seems clear that it already does so. For 
example, it is accepted that a liability insurer taking over the defence of a claim must 
as a matter of good faith have proper regard to the interests of the insured: but, as 
Lord Bingham has pointed out,137 this makes no sense if the only response that the 
insured can make is to cancel the insurance, decline cover and get his premium 
back. Unless the duty is to be regarded as a dead letter, there must be at the very 
least a power to disallow reliance on a limit of cover where the insurer's wrong 
leaves the assured personally exposed. Again, if there is a duty in the insured based 
on utmost good faith to take at least some steps to mitigate loss, it has never been 
suggested that this automatically gives the insurer the right to avoid the contract and 
cancel all cover, rather than merely to refuse to pay out to the extent that the loss 
could have been avoided; and yet again, the suggestion that in certain cases the 
right to cancel the contract or decline cover may be lost through failure to show 
utmost good faith is entirely inconsistent with any limitation to avoidance. Although 
the authority against the availability of damages for breach of contract as a direct 
remedy for breach of the duty is solid,138 this does not necessarily tell the whole 
                                            
134 This was the judicial stance at the time when s. 17 introduced “avoidance” as a remedy into the 
equation.   
135 Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 Q.B. 665, at 773–776 
(Slade LJ). 
136  [1990] 1 Q.B. 665. 
137 Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] C.L.C. 671, at 680. Compare the Hong Kong 
decision in Ace Insurance Ltd v Metropolitan Electrical Appliance Manufacturing Ltd [2009] HKCFI 
1132, where it seems to have been accepted that mishandling of a liability claim might prevent the 
insurer from relying on a deductible payable by the insured. 
138  At least in England. Other common law jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, have had fewer 
qualms: e.g., Stuart v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Co of NZ Ltd (No 2) (1988) 5 
story. It may still be possible to use the duty of utmost good faith in order to create 
indirect liability on some other basis.  
 
One example concerns the case where a liability insurer fails to have proper regard 
to the interests of the insured, for example by admitting liability for a sum much 
larger than the policy limit for inadmissible reasons. It must be arguable that there is 
liability in damages here: not because the act of failing to observe the utmost good 
faith is capable of creating a liability to compensate, but because the insurer, who in 
taking over the insured's defence was acting as the latter's agent, is now liable for 
acting outside his authority.139 The effect of the breach of the duty of utmost good 
faith is, in other words, not to create the liability but merely to set the scene for 
liability on some other basis. 
 
The other example arises where, as a result of deliberate failure in bad faith to 
provide information, one or other party directly suffers loss. Although Banque Keyser 
Ullmann makes it quite clear that no direct liability is possible here, it may be 
possible to reach the same result indirectly via deceit. Despite the general rule that 
deceit requires a positive statement and that silence is not enough,140 in Conlon v 
Simms141 Lawrence Collins J held, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that where there 
was an unsatisfied duty to speak this made up for the lack of any positive 
misrepresentation. Hence in that case it was held that a solicitor who negotiated for a 
partnership without revealing his own murky past could on principle142 be sued for 
damages in deceit. If this case is correct (and it is controversial), then the way may 
be open, at least in the case of deliberate silence, for at least some liability in 
damages.143 
 
 
VI) CONCLUSIONS 
 
The conclusions of this article can be briefly stated. First, we believe that the recast 
s. 17 of the MIA 1906 – which will no doubt be taken as representing insurance law 
generally in the manner of its predecessor – is likely to turn out to be far more than 
just the anodyne “interpretative principle” referred to by the Law Commissions when 
it comes to the development of the doctrine of utmost good faith. This is unlikely to 
be through a decision to incorporate the doctrine as an implied term, as in Australia; 
this is contrary to existing authority, and in any case we regard such a solution as 
undesirable and conducive to uncertainty. Rather, it is suggested, the removal of the 
reference to avoidance, coupled with the reaffirmation of the underlying nature of 
                                                                                                                                       
A.N.Z.I.C. 60-844. But all seem to accept that there can be no liability in tort: see Lomsargis v 
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2005] Q.S.C. 199; [2005] 2 Qd. R. 295 and 
CGU Workers Compensation NSW Ltd v Garcia (2007) 69 N.S.W.L.R. 680. 
139  As essentially was the case, though at one remove, in Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 KB 194. The 
solicitors' defence there, that they had been acting on the instructions of the plaintiff's insurers, 
failed because these had been instructions that the insurers had no business to give on behalf of 
the plaintiff. 
140  Trenchantly affirmed in Sykes v Taylor-Rose [2004] EWCA Civ 299; [2004] 2 P. & C.R. 30. 
141 [2006] EWHC 401 (Ch); [2006] 2 All E.R. 1024; (on appeal) [2006] EWCA Civ 1749; [2008] 1 
W.L.R. 484 
142 A finding of liability at first instance was reversed, but only on a pleading point. 
143   Similar sentiments have been echoed by Rix LJ, in HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v 
Chase Manhattan Bank [2001] EWCA Civ. 1250; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 483, at [48]–[49]. 
insurance contracts as requiring utmost good faith, is likely to make courts more 
willing to extend the doctrine interstitially to other situations where the remedy can be 
more nuanced. Examples may well include responses such as an inability to 
exercise rights under the contract where this would be seriously unfair, or the loss of 
the right to rely on a limit of liability. More drastic developments are perhaps unlikely, 
at least at this stage: but there will be a slow development of the idea, perhaps on 
the lines of the development of what counts as bad faith in Australia. In twenty years' 
time, it is suggested, the law of insurance may well be somewhat different from its 
form today. How different, and in what ways, only time will tell. However, one thing is 
clear: change is in the air. 
 
 
